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usually highly critically, making large claims about their very adverse economic
and social impact. A close analysis of his work demonstrates that his judgments
do not rest on a theory of trade unions which is clearly different from a
conventional treatment; nor does he anywhere present any relevant new empirical
work. Further, his methodological writings seem to disbar him from making the
kind of empirical claims on trade unions that feature throughout his writings. The
conclusion is that he was morally so offended by the extraordinary legal
immunities which the trade unions had acquired that his judgment deserted him,
so that he descended into a series of wholly untenable empirical assertions. His
significant influence on thinking and policy on industrial relations matters, at least
in the UK, looks to have been based far more on powerful emotions than on
science.
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Introduction
When reviewing one of Friedrich Hayek's books (Hayek, 1991)2
recently  I became conscious of his willingness to make a number of
important empirical judgments, particularly on trade unions, without
accompanying them by any supporting evidence.  As an example, just
one among many, consider his remarkable claim (in 1980s
Unemployment and the Unions,) that the legalised powers acquired by
British trade unions prior to 1980 became, 
"the biggest obstacle to raising the living standards of the working class
as a whole...the chief cause of the unnecessarily big differences between
the best- and worst-paid workers...the prime source of
unemployment...[and]...the main reason for the decline of the British
economy in general" (Hayek, 1991, p.344). 
That is quite a charge sheet, one worth analysing more slowly.
Hayek does not content himself with the claim that, because of their
legalised powers, British unions were an obstacle to raising living
standards among the working class, nor even that they were an
important obstacle; he makes the far more exacting empirical assertion
that, among all the many possible candidates, trade unions were the
biggest obstacle. Unions were not merely one cause of 'unnecessary'
wage differentials, nor even a major cause; they were the chief cause.
2Similarly, unions were the prime source of unemployment and the main
reason for the decline of the British economy.
Elsewhere, he makes even stronger claims. In the same
publication, for example, he asserts that 
"the policies of the unions [are], under normal conditions, the sole cause
of extensive lasting unemployment" (my underlining, Hayek, 1991,
p.318). 
Now, 'normal conditions' and 'extensive and lasting' have to be defined, but here he
has managed not only to rank the possible causes of 'extensive lasting' unemployment
under 'normal' conditions, but also to eliminate all but one of them from his
enquiries. 
Nor were unions seen to be blameless in the generation of inflation. Hayek
writes that 
"[t]he problem of inflation, the problem of employment, and the
problem of excessive power of the trade unions have become
inseparable in present-day Britain" (Hayek, 1991, p.319). 
I can find no ranking from him on the causes of inflation but there is no doubt that
Hayek would have had unions well represented in the dock.
I want to consider how should we react to these claims? Prima facie they look
extreme. We could therefore see them as unguarded or rash judgments, made by
someone who was past the peak of his formidable intellectual powers. We could
alternatively see them as hyperbole, as the rhetorical excess of someone who wished
to play politics, as propaganda. The second of these interpretations runs counter to
what little I know about the man. Arthur Seldon, someone who studied under and
worked with Hayek for many years, has said 'I remember that Hayek never showed
political bias'; Shirley Letwin recalls him saying 'The best economists were those who
3had no influence on practical affairs, because they were not distracted by thinking
about what is "politically possible"'.   Taking my lead from observations like these,3
therefore, I prefer not to interpret Hayek's claims as polemical but to start by taking
them at face value, paying Hayek the courtesy of believing that he knew exactly what
he was saying, that he had reflected deeply on the issues, and that his very strong
empirical propositions were the fruits of careful, dispassionate analysis. A second,
and equally powerful, reason for taking them seriously is that their origins are clearly
visible in The Constitution of Liberty, an unambiguously scholarly work of great
weight and considerable importance. A final reason for taking them seriously is that,
whether he sought it or not, Hayek was not without influence on public policy,
certainly in the UK; his views manifestly gave encouragement to successive UK
Governments after 1979, and helped to provide an intellectual basis for their energetic
reforms of industrial relations legislation.
My basic question will be, how did Hayek know these things? How did he
know that, alongside all the other possible inhibitions on raising the living standards
of the working class as a whole, it was the influence of trade unions that was the
most baleful? How did he know that unions were 'normally' the sole cause of
extensive lasting unemployment, and that nothing else made a contribution? How did
he know that it was the legal powers granted to unions and not, for example, the
inadequacies of British management, or the grotesque failures of our educational
system, or the inevitable penalties of being the first economy to experience
industrialisation, or an acquired distaste amongst certain social groups for being 'in
trade', or a series of profoundly misconceived economic policies of successive
governments that was the main reason for British economic decline? 
4When addressing this kind of question one would usually start by analysing
of the logic of the relevant theory and then go on to consider the evidence that had
been marshalled. That procedure is hardly possible here. First, Hayek does not lay
out his theory of trade unions in a conventional, tight fashion, so that one cannot
know precisely why unions might be thought to have the kind of consequences
claimed. Second, Hayek rarely cites supporting evidence. Quite often, his judgments
appear almost out of the blue. My alternative approach, therefore, is first to compare
Hayek with Friedman, in order to see whether anything extra can be discerned in
Hayek's theoretical approach that might support his very strong conclusions. I will
conclude that it is hard to identify any such extra element, so that Hayek's view must
rest on a different interpretation of the evidence. I will then consider whether his
propositions had any support from the facts as they appeared at the time (and later).
Finally, I will ask whether his willingness to make such astonishingly unqualified and
precise empirical judgments sits well with his more general methodological position
on the merits of empirical, particularly statistical, enquiry.
5HAYEK'S THEORY OF TRADE UNIONS
As a context within which to judge Hayek's theoretical position I will start
with that of Milton Friedman, another economist who might be expected to take a
generally critical view of the virtues of trade unions. Friedman, of course, also taught
at the University of Chicago, and his analysis was certainly known to Hayek. 
Writing in the early 1960s, just after The Constitution of Liberty, Friedman
observed, of unions in the USA, that 
"[t]here is a similar tendency to overestimate the importance of
monopoly on the side of labor. Labor unions include roughly a quarter
of the working population and this greatly overestimates the
importance of unions on the structure of wages. Many unions are
utterly ineffective. Even the strong and powerful unions have only a
limited effect on the wage structure . . . .  This is not to say that unions
are unimportant . . . .I once made a rough estimate that because of
unions something like 10 to 15 per cent of the working population has
had its wage rates raised by something like 10 to 15 per cent. This
means that something like 85 or 90 per cent of the working population
has had its wage rates reduced by some 4 per cent . . . .  If unions raise
wage rates in a particular occupation . . . they necessarily make the
amount of employment available in that occupation . . . less than it
would otherwise be . . . .  The effect is an increased number of persons
seeking other jobs, which forces down wages in other occupations . . .
. Unions have therefore not only harmed the public at large and
workers as whole by distorting the use of labor; they have also made
the incomes of the working class more unequal by reducing the
opportunities available to the most disadvantaged workers" (Friedman,
1962, p123-4).
Friedman's analysis of unions was given at greater length in an earlier
publication (Wright, 1953) but the above quotation presents his view more succinctly.
It clearly differs from Hayek's. Unions certainly have an effect on the wage structure,
but the effect looks to be relatively small; unions do not obviously cause lasting
unemployment, because the workers who are displaced from the unionised sectors
can find alternative employment (albeit not as well-paid) in the unorganised sectors;
6as unions tend to be more powerful among the relatively skilled manual trades, they
also tend to widen the distribution of earnings. There is no suggestion that unions
have lasting effects on the rate of economic growth, although they are clearly seen
to reduce the level of aggregate income below what it would otherwise be. The
activities of unions are to be regretted, but their importance is easy to overstate.
Friedman's analysis is squarely within the Marshallian tradition and is backed
by some limited, but acutely observed, statistical analysis. Another economist writing
on some of these issues in Chicago in the 1950s and early 1960s was H.G. Lewis. In
a monumentally scholarly work on the impact of unions on relative wages in the
USA, Lewis concluded that Friedman's empirical judgments on relative wages were
about right (Lewis, 1963). These, of course, are American views, and unionisation in
the US was not as extensive as in many European countries with which Hayek was
familiar. Even so, Hayek rarely draws careful empirical distinctions between the two
geographical areas, not at least in The Constitution of Liberty. His analysis is quite
general and tends to indict unions in all developed countries in a roughly similar
fashion.
His starting point is important. Hayek does not approach these issues with the
light-handed rational touch of a Marshallian economist. He begins instead with the
observation that trade unions are the glaring exception to the rule of law in modern
societies; they 
"have become the only important instance in which governments
signally fail in their prime function -- the prevention of coercion and
violence" (Hayek, 1960, p.267). 
The root of their power was an ability to coerce, an ability which was
protected by the law --  Hayek specified their main coercive weapons to be
7intimidatory picketing, the closed shop and secondary action:
"[t]he present coercive powers of unions thus rest chiefly on the use of
methods which would not be tolerated for any other purpose... In the
first place, the unions rely...on the use of the picket line as an
instrument of intimidation...next to the toleration of picketing, the chief
factor which enables unions to coerce individual workers is the sanction
by both legislation and jurisdiction of the closed...shop... We must also
regard as inadmissable methods of coercion all secondary strikes and
boycotts which are used not as an instrument of wage bargaining but
solely as a means of forcing other workers to fall in with union
policies." (Hayek, 1960, p.275).
In certain circumstances, Hayek asserts, these powers could have dramatic
effects; 'any union effectively controlling all potential workers of a firm or industry
can exercise almost unlimited pressure on the employer and . . . particularly where
a great amount of capital has been invested in specialized equipment, such a union
can practically expropriate the owner and command nearly the whole return of his
enterprise' (Hayek, 1960, p.270). Only after this dark opening do we move on to more
commonplace events, although the texture of the language retains an element of
violent assertion throughout.
Unions were seen to interfere with free market allocations by changing relative
wages (and hence relative costs and relative prices); 
"unions in particular industries or crafts may well raise the wages of
their members by forcing others to stay in less-well-paid occupations.
How great a distortion of the wage structure this in fact causes is
difficult to say... [but]...there can be little doubt that this distortion is
considerable. It is important to note that such policies can be employed
successfully only in relatively prosperous and highly paid occupations
and that they will therefore result in the exploitation of the relatively
poor by the better-off." (Hayek, 1960, p.271). 
Hayek provides no supporting evidence to show that the distortion was
'considerable', nor is 'considerable' defined -- what we are given instead is an
assertion. His claim that unions can be successful only in the relatively prosperous
8trades is also a strong one, and it will surprise many of those who have studied, for
example, the impact of British unions which organise amongst less skilled workers.
This passage is followed immediately by another assertion; 'there can be little
doubt that, so far as relative wages in major industries and trades are concerned,
unions today are largely responsible for an inequality which has no function and is
entirely the result of privilege'. If this is no more than a re-statement of the point that
unions have succeeded in distorting relative wages it is unexceptional. But the
language suggests more. It implies that unions are by far the chief cause of any
departure from the wage differentials that would be observed in a completely free
market. For us to be confident that Hayek is correct we surely need to be given some
idea of what the free market differentials would be, but Hayek does not explicitly
address this issue (indeed, he elsewhere claims these to be unknowable). What he
does instead is to leap from the empirically verifiable point of positive union
mark-ups to a conjecture, masquerading as an obvious fact, about the causes of wage
dispersion. If this were an isolated instance it might be excused as careless writing;
in fact, it is an integral part of Hayek's usual style on these issues. One might fairly
say that he is a conviction economist.
In The Constitution of Liberty Hayek is concerned to stress that unions cannot
raise the average real wage: 'there can now be no doubt that they [unions] cannot in
the long run increase real wages for all wishing to work above the level that would
establish itself in a free market... Their success in raising real wages ... can benefit
only a particular group at the expense of others. It will therefore serve only a
sectional interest' (Hayek, 1960, p.270). And again, '[t]his means that their activities
necessarily reduce the productivity of labour all round and therefore also the general
9level of real wages' (Hayek, 1960, p.271).
What about the impact of unions on unemployment? It is true that Hayek does
hint that unions will cause unemployment by displacing workers from the unionised
sector. But it is hard to see that displacement is sufficient, because, under
conventional arguments, wages elsewhere would adjust downwards sufficiently to
absorb the workers displaced from the unionised trades. Things would be radically
different (i) if governments were to intervene to stop the unskilled market from
clearing, or (ii) if the unions were as strong in this market as elsewhere. Hayek
explicitly discounts the second and does not mention the first in his chapter on
unions. In a subsequent chapter, however, he does discuss the role of unemployment
compensation, where he writes 
"t]he chief significance of the comprehensive systems of unemployment
compensation that have been adopted in all Western countries... is that
they operate in a labor market dominated by the coercive action of
unions and that they have been designed under strong union influence
with the aim of assisting the unions in their wage policies. A system in
which a worker is regarded as unable to find employment and therefore
is entitled to benefit because the workers in the firm or industry in
which he seeks employment are on strike necessarily becomes a major
support of union wage pressure." (Hayek, 1960, p.302). 
Hayek's use of language may now be familiar. Western labor markets are said
to be 'dominated' by the coercive actions of unions, but 'dominated' (an extremely
strong word) is not defined, and the fact of domination (if it be a fact) is never
documented. In other contexts this would, justly, be regarded not as scholarly
analysis but as the biased language of prejudice. A second example of this quality
comes with the claim that those who designed these systems did so to support union
wage policies. There is a strong implication that they did so consciously, and that this
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was their sole aim. It is demonstrably the case that neither of these propositions is
generally correct. This is not to deny that unions were assisted by unemployment
compensation schemes, nor that the schemes are almost certain to have contributed
to higher unemployment. But Hayek is not satisfied by such qualitative statements.
Going beyond them, however, requires a lot more than obiter dicta.
One strange omission from Hayek's charge sheet against unions in The
Constitution of Liberty is his silence on the matter of minimum wages, because these
would normally be thought to prevent market clearing at the bottom of the
occupational and skill distribution. He could well have pointed out that unions are
among the most forceful advocates of minimum wages, that minimum wages can be
seen as a device to limit the extent to which union members are priced out of work,
and that, by preventing the unorganised labour markets from clearing, they may
make an important contribution to unemployment. 
One issue on which Hayek clearly differs from Friedman is on inflation. Hayek
believed that unions' monopoly-based increases in money wages led to inflation,
whereas Friedman was sceptical. But Hayek emphasised that his own position was
predicated on governments having made a commitment to full employment, so that
they had to print money to offset the unemployment effects of higher money wages:
"[i]f labour insists on a level of money wages too high to allow of full
employment, the supply of money must be so increased as to raise
prices to a level where the real value of the prevailing money wages is
no longer greater than the productivity of the workers seeking
employment. In practice, this necesarily means that each separate union,
in its attempt to overtake the value of money, will never cease to insist
on further increases in money wages and that the aggregate effort of the
unions will thus bring about progressive inflation," (Hayek, 1960, p.280).
The problem with this position is that Hayek virtually assumes his result in
the first sentence of the quotation. It is not clear from what he says how unions
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succeed in pushing up, or continuing to push up, average money wages above the
level to which they would be taken by all the other influences. It is easy to agree that
they change the wage structure, and even that they reduce average real wages. But
Hayek provides no justification to support the idea that they raise money wages on
average; for him they just insist and succeed. The effect is merely assumed. If it is
assumed, and if governments do seek to offset any resulting unemployment, then the
unions' partial culpability in the inflationary process is established. But Hayek still
has to explain why, ceteris paribus, the rise in wages of the unionised will not be
balanced by a fall in wages of the non-unionised.
The issue of inflation apart, Hayek of The Constitution of Liberty is not
analytically so different from Friedman. The intangibles differ, the overtones are
darker, and the language is more menacing, but the core theory is from the same
stable. Hayek forbears from statistical analysis, whereas Friedman is prepared to
make some rough calculations to support his position. But the real difference is in the
language and in Hayek's willingness, even in The Constitution of Liberty, to go
beyond what is demonstrated, and to make unnecessarily tendentious and careless
empirical statements. Thus, he can write 
"[m]ost people probably still believe that a "labor dispute" normally
means a disagreement about remuneration and the conditions of
employment, while as often as not its sole cause is an attempt on the
part of the unions to force unwilling workers to join" (Hayek, 1960,
p.268). 
This assertion was not limited by time or place, but it would certainly not apply to
Britain in the 1950s (or for nearly all the period since that time), when,
overwhelmingly, strikes were about money.
A striking feature of the economic analysis in The Constitution of Liberty is
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that it is fundamentally static (more specifically, the analysis is comparative static),
which is perhaps why Hayek's conclusions are so similar to those of the Marshallian
Friedman. Unions appear, take their monopoly profit, have an impact on
capital/labour ratios, affect productivity levels and so on. But it is hard to see the
dynamics. It is hard, in other words, to see why unions should continue to have an
additional effect on, say, the subsequent rate of growth or on economic decline. One
senses in the writing, however, that a different tradition, a cloudier Continental one
which sees economic events as a more organic and protean process, is trying to
escape. In the later writings this other tradition is somewhat more visible.
In Full Employment at Any Price, for example, Hayek writes the following; 
"[t]he true, but untestable, explanation of extensive unemployment
ascribes it to a discrepancy between the distribution of labour ...
between industries ... and the distribution of demand between their
products' (Hayek, 1991, p.271).
 Anything that increases that discrepancy presumably reduces employment and
increases unemployment. We leave to one side the implications of this hypothesis
being untestable (and the claim that, somehow, we anyway know it to be true), so
as to see what it might say about the effects of trade unions. In particular, how in a
dynamic system do unions cause discrepancies that differ from those in a world of
comparative statics? Given that elsewhere they are said normally to be the sole cause
of extensive lasting unemployment, they must be the sole cause of an important set
of additional discrepancies.
Hayek is surely correct to argue that a dynamic economy is characterised by
a continuing change in the structure of demands, which generally implies the
desirability of changing the structure of employment. This latter change requires
signals, which in turn, for Hayek, implies changes in relative wages. The problem
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with unions, it would seem, is that they are seen to throttle changes in relative wages.
But what presumption is there that unions do affect either the size or the timing of
changes in relative wages in the face of all sorts of shocks in the economic system?
Assume demand picks up in a strongly unionised sector. Standard theory,
based on the maximisation of some stable objective function, would predict that this
would result in some rise in relative wages for the unionised workers. The extent of
the rise would depend on a number of factors, including the objectives and beliefs
of the trade unions. But it is not clear that the change in the relative wage would be
much different in the unionised situation from that in a free market; we might expect
the level of the relative wage to be greater with unions than in a free market both
before and after the exogenous shock, but we would be less confident that the size
of the change itself would be different. It is not yet obvious, therefore, that unions
lead to additional 'discrepancies' in a dynamic as compared with a comparative static
world.
It is possible that unions slow down the adjustment in wages, especially where
they are party to relatively long term contracts, as in the US. Even in this case their
contribution to resource allocation in the face of exogenous shocks is not clear cut.
If demand rises in a unionised sector where wages are sticky, the gap between the
free market and the union wage shrinks, because the increase in demand would raise
the former. Any existing misallocation of resources is presumably reduced, because
relative wages are now closer to the efficient, free market level. This should, on
Hayek's argument, reduce unemployment. If, to the contrary, demand were to fall in
a unionised sector characterised by sticky wages, we would get the reverse. On
average, therefore, the effect on unemployment of any additional discrepancy from
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the analysis of the dynamics might well net out to zero; it is certainly not
pre-ordained to be positive. To be persuaded, we need to have the dynamics, and
perhaps the source of shocks,  modelled in some detail, but Hayek does not do this.4
It is therefore far from clear that unions have a special role to play, still less a
dominant role, in Hayek's preferred theory of unemployment.
The Hayek of 1980s Unemployment and the Unions had come to the view that
trade unions were the principal source of most of Britain's important economic
problems (see the opening quotation above). Their main, legally based coercive
powers were now seen to be 'intimidatory picketing, preventing non-members from
doing particular kinds of jobs such as 'demarcation' rules, and the closed shop'
(Hayek, 1991, p.345-6). The second of these looks like a category error. One might
agree that restrictive practices were extremely costly, but it is better to see them (like
union wage mark-ups) as a consequence of power rather than being a legally
recognised right. Hayek now suspects that the powers of unions are not in the
interest even of union members; 
"[i]t is more than doubtful, however, whether in the long run these
selfish practices have improved the real wages of even those workers
whose unions have been most successful in driving up their relative
wages... Such practices ... have turned Britain, which at one time had
the highest wages in Europe, into a relatively low-wage economy"
(Hayek, 1991, p.346).
 It will be noted that they are not said to be among the factors which turned Britain
into a relatively low wage economy -- for Hayek, they seem to have been sufficient
by themselves.
I have said enough to suggest that, from the more orthodox Chicagoan context
offered by Friedman, the additional theoretical points raised by Hayek do not
unambiguously support the case that unions are as influential as he claimed. We
15
must therefore move on to empirical issues.
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DO HAYEK'S ASSERTIONS AGREE WITH THE FACTS?
It would not be enough for a defender of Hayek's position to establish that
unions had made a contribution, even an important one, to the outcomes I have been
discussing. He would also have to demonstrate that their role was as powerful and
dominating as that claimed by Hayek. How might this be done? One problem is that
Hayek at no point discusses the evidence in an orderly way. On the issue of long
term economic decline, he does not even sketch a framework which would allow one
to identify the set of possible causes. We are therefore left with a set of virtually ex
cathedra statements.
In order to judge, for example, whether unions were indeed the sole cause of
extensive lasting unemployment one might relate unemployment rates across
countries to different legal systems or the level of trade union membership, arguing
that where unions do not have the legally guaranteed rights which Hayek regards as
so dangerous a country will not have extensive and lasting unemployment. If this
were done, say, at present across western Europe it is not easy to see much of a
pattern -- it is certainly easy to cite countries, France is one, where union membership
is extremely low but unemployment has been in a clear sense high for some
considerable time.  
An alternative approach would be to concentrate on a single country and chart
movements in unemployment against changes in that country's legal system or trade
union membership levels. Well, unemployment in the UK is currently (1993) near to
record levels but most of the trade union powers to which Hayek raised objections
have been removed, and union membership is nearly one third below what it was
ten to fifteen years ago. Neither of these are completely convincing tests but they do
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suggest that it would be hard to establish unions' sole responsibility for extensive
lasting unemployment .
Hayek stressed the importance of the coercive power of intimidatory picketing
and secondary action. But these were used in conjunction with strikes, and Britain has
never obviously had, by international standards, a grave strike problem. The amount
of time the average British worker spends on strike rarely exceeds a few hours per
year. On most calculations Britain is normally somewhere in the middle of the
international league table on strike incidence. Strikes were, of course, a very serious
problem for selected firms in selected industries, but this means that they (together
with the genuine prospect of intimidatory picketing) must have been pretty distant
for the typical firm. It is difficult to believe that so rarely used a weapon could have
had the dramatic and pervasive effects that Hayek saw.
Perhaps Hayek felt that picketing was so potent a weapon that it rarely had
to be used -- its importance was inversely related to its use. This would be
reminiscent of another of his arguments, concerning the set of coercive powers that
he saw unions as having:- 
"The case against these [powers] is strengthened rather than weakened
by the fact that unions have often shown much restraint in exercising
them. It is precisely because, in the existing legal situation, unions could
do infinitely more harm than they do, and because we owe it to the
moderation and good sense of many union leaders, that the situation is
not much worse that we cannot afford to allow the present state of
affairs to continue." (Hayek, 1960, p.269). 
This looks a pretty disingenuous argument; one can hardly imagine him
arguing that, were unions to use all their powers to the full, the case against them
would be weakened. If unions were indeed not using their powers to the full, Hayek
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should surely have been a little less, rather than more, concerned. 
The position on closed shops is similar to that on intimidatory picketing.
Formal closed shops in the UK never encompassed more than a minority of unionised
workers, while union membership barely attained majority status in the labour force
(and then only briefly). Econometric work finds that appreciable union wage
mark-ups are often hard to detect outside the closed shop sectors, and that even there
it was only in a subset of closed shops that the mark-up reached double figures.
Could the closed shop, itself an institution that grew fast only in the late-1960s and
1970s, really have been the principal cause of Britain's economic decline, or the reason
why we now enjoy eleven per cent unemployment? The last point is, of course,
slightly malicious. Britain no longer has formal, legally tolerated closed shops,
intimidatory picketing or secondary action, but we do have extensive, lasting
unemployment. It is overwhelmingly probable that all these issues are a great deal
more complicated than Hayek's view permitted him to appreciate.
19
HAYEK AND TESTING
Hayek would, I presume, discount any enquiry of the kind just sketched. His
Nobel Prize lecture (later published under the title of The Pretence of Knowledge,
Hayek, 1991, pp.280-291) was one of his attempts to demonstrate how our ability to
understand economic phenomena empirically was inherently extremely limited. He
writes, 
"in the study of such "essentially complex" phenomena   as the market,5
which depend on the actions of many individuals, all the circumstances
that will determine the outcome of a process...will hardly ever be fully
known or measurable" (Hayek, 1991, p.282, italics in the original). 
He illustrates his position by considering the causes of unemployment: 
"The correct explanation appears to me to be the existence of
discrepancies between the distribution of demand among the different
goods and services and the allocation of labour and other resources
among the production of those outputs. We possess a fairly good
"qualitative" knowledge of the forces by which a correspondence
between demand and supply in the different sectors of the economic
system is brought about, of the conditions under which it will be
achieved, and of the factors likely to prevent such an adjustment. The
separate steps in the account of this process rely on facts of everyday
experience... We know, in other words, the general  conditions in which
what we call, somewhat misleadingly, an "equilibrium" will establish
itself; but we will never know the particular   prices or wages that
would exist if the market were to bring about such an equilibrium."
(ibid ).
 
A theory then is supported by 'the facts of everyday experience'. These
somehow give us our 'qualitative knowledge' of 'essentially complex' phenomena;
what this does is to permit the observer to make 'pattern predictions', which Hayek
defines as 
"predictions of some of the general attributes of the structures that will
form themselves, but not containing specific statements about the
individual elements of which the structures will be made up" (Hayek,
1991, p.284). 
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I think it is fair to conclude from this that Hayek must argue that 'the facts of
everyday experience' inform us that trade unions have had a powerful and socially
unfortunate impact; but  even if we grant him this knowledge, he surely must also
argue, given that we can never know the relevant 'particular' facts, that we will not
be able to make specific statements about individual elements. Does this not
inevitably imply that we can never gauge how far, in absolute terms, any one of these
elements (trade unions for example) have taken us from the free market equilibria
with respect to unemployment, the distribution of earnings, inflation or economic
growth? 
For him therefore, it must in principle be impossible to know the individual
contribution of any of the potential specific causes of an 'essentially complex'
outcome. But if he cannot know that, neither can he rank the different causes, nor
confidently give prime responsibility to any one of them. Hayek's own
methodological precepts, therefore, should prevented him from making the empirical
judgments which have been our focus.
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CONCLUSIONS
There would have been nothing especially controversial if Hayek had merely
wished to say that British trade unions had almost certainly been an important source
of economic inefficiency (even though that is far from being the whole of their
legacy). But he wanted to go much fur1ther. In analysing a set of immensely complex
social forces he was sufficiently confident implicitly to rank the possible causes, and
to say that one rather than another was the most powerful. Any such empirical claim
deserves to be taken seriously only if it is the result of a thorough examination of the
evidence which isolates the contribution of one of the possible causes (trade unions)
from that of all the others. It cannot be enough to rely on a theory, no matter how
plausible or convincing that might seem to be. But Hayek's theoretical arguments on
these issues are not especially novel, and he produces no empirical results of his own,
preferring instead to quote the fragmentary work of other writers, themselves a
highly selected subset from all those who had addressed the relevant issues. One may
illustrate the frailty of his position by asking the following question:- if unions were
the biggest obstacle to raising living standards, then what was the next greatest
obstacle? How, in logic, could Hayek possibly know the one without the other?  
In many ways this has been a difficult series of arguments for me to make,
because I am broadly sympathetic to much of Hayek's underlying position. I certainly
would not wish to be interpreted as arguing that unions have been unimportant, still
less benign, in their complex economic legacy (although their non-economic legacy
is, perhaps, another matter). With Friedman, I am confident that, at least in the UK,
they have been an enemy of economic efficiency. Nor would I wish  to deny some
of Hayek's strictures on econometrics (for example the damaging reliance on what
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seems to be measurable, or the very free use economists make of 'proxies' or dummy
variables). But Hayek's methodological position is surely too restrictive, and we can
reasonably claim to know more than he allows. What we do know, I suggest, is that
his empirical judgments on trade unions are vastly overblown. Certainly his own
methodological position means that he himself has no basis on which to make them.
My own suspicion is that he was morally so offended by the extraordinary legal
immunities which the trade unions had acquired that his judgment deserted him, so
that he descended into a series of wholly untenable empirical assertions. I would not
like to charge him with being a propagandist, but on the issues discussed in this
paper he certainly seems to have been in the grip of powerful emotions.
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1. Department of Industrial Relations and Centre for Economic Performance,
London School of Economics.  I would like to thank my colleagues Stephen
Dunn, Bob Gould, and John Kelly for comments on an earlier draft, which was
given at the Hayek Memorial Conference in London in April 1993.  The Centre
for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research
Council.
2. This was a collection of pieces he had done for the IEA over the years.
3. Both of these statements come from tributes paid to Hayek at a memorial 
meeting at the London School of Economics in September 1992.
4. I am abstracting throughout from search theories of unemployment; this might
be unfair to Hayek because, although he was (as far as I know) never explicit
about search behaviour, it should be possible to fit it in to his view of 
economic events.
5. i.e. something which 'must refer to a large  number of particular facts, all of 
which must be ascertained before we can derive a prediction from it, or test
it' (Hayek, 1991, p.289, italics in the original).
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